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CRIMINAL LAW
GEORGE W. PRETTYMAN*
MURDER

During the thirty month period covered by this survey, the Supreme
Court handed down opinions in thirteen murder cases. Six of these
decisions affirmed convictions in the first degree.
Commutation of death penalty.-The court refused to commute the
death penalty. It held that only the jury or the Board of Pardons may
substitute a less severe penalty for one more severe.'
Harmless error.-It is harmless error for the prosecutor to remark that
the defendant, if convicted, would be released by the Board of Pardons,
and would be brought back again. 2 Another error held harmless was a
conference, in the absence of the defendant, between the judge, the jury
and two attorneys.8
Reversible error.-It was error to admit the calier statement of a
witness in corroboration. 4 Also, to recall a witness to base an impeachment
was an abuse of discretion and error.5 To refuse to permit the state
fingerprint witness to state that the prints on the murder gun were not the
defendant's was a reversible error.6
A third degree murder conviction, in an abortion case, was reversed
and a new trial ordered, because of the vague admission of a dying
declaration favorable to the defendant.7 It is difficult to perceive the
error in this admission as the case was tried without a jury. "The Trial
Judge heard the witness and did not see fit to disturb the verdict of the
jun,." However, the court does not seem to follow this wise precept in
the cases it reversed.
Preston v. State9 was reversed because of insufficient evidence of
traffic conditions. Defendant drove his car at 50 miles per hour through
an intersection in a 25 miles per hour zone, in a city, and killed a
passenger in another ear. There was testimony to the effect that right
after the collision sonic 3000 persons gathered. This is certainly some
*Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1.Johnson v. State, 61 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1952).
2. McMann v. State, 55 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1952).
3. Thomas v. State, 65 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1953).
4. Van Gallon v. State, 50 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1950).
5. Holm v. State, 58 So.Zd 188 (Fla. 1952).
6. Coco v. State, 62 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1953).
7. Grimes v. State, 64 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1953).
8. Mitchell v. State, 59 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1952).
9. 56 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1952).
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evidence upon which the jury could find conditions under which the
conduct of the driver would be culpable negligence.
In another killing by car, a manslaughter conviction was reversed on
similar grounds.'( Here the defendant drove fast around a curve, lost
control, skidded off the road for 300 feet, rolled an additional 152 feet,
then rolled over three timcs, killing the passenger. The jury wias satisfied
that this was culpable negligence and manslaughter. The court reversed the
judgment on the ground that the evidence was not both consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with innocence.
In another case,' the defendant was driving 60 to 65 miles per tour
at night in the country when he struck and killed a pedestrian. The car
skidded 200 feet and rolled 79 feet further. Ile jury's verdict, and the
judgment thereon was reversed because the evidence did not evince a
"reckless disregard for human life." This last phrase is close to the
definition of murder in the second degree. The Florida Statutes Section
782.04 provides that the unlawful killing of a human being, "Whcn
perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another, and evincing a
depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated
design to effect the death of any particular individual, it shall be murder
in the second degree .... "
These three reversals were not based on errors of law, but on the
insufficiency of the evidence to convince the Supreme Court. It is submitted
that the test of sufficiency is provided solely for the jury.
RAPE

Inflamatory remarks.-With respect to rape, two out of five convictions
were reversed. Inflamatory remarks of the prosecutor secured a new trial
for one defendant. 2 The prosecutor called the defendant names and
predicted that defendant's wife would stick to him bccausc of her religion.
It would seem that remarks in a case like this, where the act was admitted
and the only defense was consent, would amount to harmless error only.
Charge to the jury.-The charge against a defendant was breaking and
entering with intent to commit the felony of rape. The trial judge failed
to instruct that the breaking must have been done with the intent to
commit rape. The court seemed to believe that the jury might have
overlooked the intent and convicted merely on breaking and entering,
and therefore, found the error in the charge to the jury grounds for
reversal.13
10. Maxey v. State, 64 So.2d 677 (Vla. 1953).
11. Smith v. State, 65 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1953).
12. Gluck v. State, 62 So.2d 71 (Fa. 1952).
13. Gerds v. State, 64 So.2d 915 (Fa. 1953).
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Molesters.-Both of the molester cases to reach the Supreme Court
were reversed and new trials granted. One case'4 was reversed because the
prosecutor said, "The time to stop a sexual fiend and maniac is in the
beginning and not wait until some poor little child or some little girl
[has] lost her life . . . or been mutilated."
In another case,", a new trial was granted because the jury was
confused as to the defendant's mental status.
MISCELLANEOUS

Three out of four convictions of assault were reversed.

Seven out

of ten convictions of crimes against property also were reversed.
Thirty-seven convictions involving gaming, narcotics, and liquor, were
appealed. Twenty-five were reversed.
Illegal search and seizure.-Illegal arrest, illegal search and insufficiency
of the evidence constituted a frequent ground for reversal.

The driver of

a car may of course be arrested for a traffic violation, and his ear be
searched, but not for an alleged violation."' The fact that the search
17
produces illegal fruit will not validate the illegal search.
An interesting reversal is Scaglione v. State.' rflle defendant was
charged with being "connected" with a lottery, a felony tinder Florida
Statutes Section 844.09. The evidence of the connection came from the
defendant's own lips. The police had arrested sonic men with lottery
tickets in their possession and were booking them, when the defendant
arrived. Hc complained that the police were, as lie put it, "pickin[g]
on my men." Two officers testified to this. The jury believed them and
handed down a conviction. This conviction was reversed for insufficient
evidence.
PROCEDURE

Juries.-The twenty-three person grand jury in large counties has been
validated.' 9 Requiring a negro juror to cat in an alcove away from the
rest of the jury was reversible error. -" A juror convicted of a crime, but
pardoned, is not disqualified from service on the jury. ' Tanpering with a
jury is a sufficient ground for declaring a mistrial, so a subsequent trial for
the same offense was not double jeopardy.-"- But it was error to declare
14.
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Stewart v. State, 51 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1951).
51 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1951).
Burley v. State, 59 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1952).
Brown v. State, 62 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1953).
62 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1953).
Clein v. State, 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950).
Cacciatore v. State, 49 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1950).
Story v. State, 53 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1951).
Larkins v. Lewis, 54 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1951).
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a mistrial in a drunken driving case on the ground that the defendant's
23
witnesses were vague, so a new trial constituted jeopardy.
A principal was charged as an accessory in Weathers v. State. 4 This
was reversible error since the defendant was present at the abortion.
Habitual erimninals.-The validity of the sentence for habitual
criminals 2- was considered in several cases. A life prisoner complained of
improper sentence, since his third and fourth sentences were pronounced
on the same day.20 The court agreed with him, and with three others
27
making the same claim.
LEGISIATION

Subversive activities are penalized up to $20,000 in fine and/or 20
years in prison. 28 Murder in the first degree is enlarged to cover a killing
in the attempt or consummation of an abominable crime or kidnapping 29
30
or as a result of tampering with trains or aircraft.
Larceny has been re-defined to embrace acts which formerly constituted embezzlement.31 The distinction between armed and unarmed
robbery was wiped out.82 Bribery was enlarged to include the bribing of
appointees, and appointees of deputies. ' 13
The wearing of masks except under certain circumstances was made
a misdemeanor?"4 Both sessions of the legislatures dealt with the passing
of worthless checks. Only the later need be noted. In this act, 5-" the
intent to defraud is not a part of the crime, thus facilitating convictions.
To further discourage gambling, if communication facilities are removed
from the premises because of gambling, a liquor license, if any, for the
premises is suspended:?0 A duty has been imposed on public utilities to
report to the Public Utilities Commission any use of their communication
facilities in aid of gambling.
The preoccupation of the legislature with the protection of children
is evidenced by a number of acts. Ilie irregular adoption of children is now
made a felony38 to curb the "baby-selling racket." Child Molester Acts
23. State ex rel. Wilson v, Lewis, 55 So.2d 118 (Fla. 1951).

24. 56 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
25. FLA. STAr. § 775.10 (1951).

26. State ex tel. Reed v. Mayo 61 So,2d 757 (Fla. 1952).
27. Rambo v. Mayo, 65 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1953); Hodges v. Mayo, 65 So.2d 750
(Fla. 1953); Copeland v. Mayo, 65 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1953).
28. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28221.
29. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1953).
30. FLA. STAT. § 782.06 (1953).
31. FL. STAT. § 811.02(1t) (1951).
32. FLA. STAT. § 813 (1951).
33. FLA. STAT. § 838.02 (1953).
34. FLA. STAT. § 876.20 (1951).
35. FLA. STAT. C. 832 (1953).
36. FLA. STAT. § 561.29 (1951).
37. FLA. STAT. § 364.31 (1951).
38. FLA. STAT. § 72.40 (1951).
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were passed in 1951"9 and 195340 approaching the problem from the curative
rather than from the punitive point of view. The juvenile court was set
up in 1951.41 The Act was amended in 195342 to require the return
of juveniles turned over for trial to the circuit court to the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court, in the event of no action being taken there. Acts of
,non-feasance contributing to the delinquency of a minor are now
penalized. 43
Arrests may now be made without a warrant for acts of cruelty
44
to children or animals.

39.

40.
41.
42,
43.
44.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 801.01 (1951).
§ 801.02 (1953.
§
§
§
§

3901 (1951). See 6 MIAMI L.Q. 1 (1951).
39.02 (1953).
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